The term 'consciousness' has not been consistently used in the history of philosophy and psychology. It has been taken to stand for the mental activity in which all of us are engaged during our waking lives, whether absorbed in the solving of a task or in calm moments of contemplation. It has also been allied with the term 'introspection' to stand for a self-monitoring activity, one in which we are not simply engaged, but in which we aware of the succession (...) of mental items that constitute our experiences. In Consciousness and the Computational Mind, Ray Jackendoff opts for this second sense and exploits it to criticize the "central processing" theory of consciousness. The background assumption for all such theories is that the human mind is to be conceived on the model of a computer whose central processor controls in accordance with programmed instructions the reception of inputs, delegation of tasks to secondary processors carrying out sub-routines, storage and retrieval of information, and finally the production of outputs. The central processing theory identifies consciousness with the activities of those areas of the brain which function as central processor as defined by this model. Jackendoff's alternative theory correlates consciousness with intermediate-level informational structures operated on by secondary processors. Of the higher-level structures and the processes operating on them, the level we refer to with such terms as 'conceptualization' and 'understanding,' we are, he contends, unconscious. (shrink)

This book presents a straightforward account of disease, the problems of practice, and the moral, legal and financial questions in the field.

Rousseau argued forcefully for the superiority of a life lived in accordance with "the simplest impulses of nature," but his complex (some would say contradictory) understanding of the relationship between humans and "nature" is rarely cited as a source of inspiration by those seeking to reform the human relationship with the natural world. We argue that the complexities of Rousseau's political thought illuminate important connections between his works and the programs put forth by deep ecology. In Part One, we explore (...) the theoretical connections between Rousseau's account of the human fall from nature and major works of radical environmentalism. In Part Two, we offer suggestions for a reconsideration of Rousseau's work that may illuminate the paradoxical political requirements of deep ecology's recommendations for a more ecological human life. We hope to illustrate how a careful reading of Rousseau's work may serve as the basis for fruitful questioning of environmentalist thought. (shrink)

1988 : Does being a Christian physician really matter? / Edmund D. Pellegrino, response by John Robinson -- 1989: Clinical medical ethics: a review of the first decade / Mark Siegler, response by Maura Ryan -- 1990 : Who or what is an embryo? / Richard McCormick, response Margaret Monahan Hogan -- 1991: Euthanasia: Where is the debate going? / Daniel Callahan, response by Paul Weithman -- 1992: The moral inevitability of two tiers of health care / H. Tristram (...) Engelhardt, Jr., response by Joel James Shuman -- 1993: Compasionate care of the dying / James F. Bresnahan, response by John Young. (shrink)

This volume examines some of the most contentious social justice issues present in the corpus of Augustine's writings. Whether one is concerned with human trafficking and the contemporary slave trade, the global economy, or endless wars, these essays further the conversation on social justice as informed by the writings of Augustine of Hippo.

We introduce the notion of “δ-complete decision procedures” for solving SMT problems over the real numbers, with the aim of handling a wide range of nonlinear functions including transcendental functions and solutions of Lipschitz-continuous ODEs. Given an SMT problemϕ and a positive rational number δ, a δ-complete decision procedure determines either that ϕ is unsatisfiable, or that the “δ-weakening” of ϕ is satisfiable. Here, the δ-weakening of ϕ is a variant of ϕ that allows δ-bounded numerical perturbations on ϕ. We (...) establish the existence and complexity of δ-complete decision procedures for bounded SMT over reals with functions mentioned above. We propose to use δ-completeness as an ideal requirement for numerically-driven decision procedures. As a concrete example, we formally analyze the DPLL〈ICP〉 framework, which integrates Interval Constraint Propagation in DPLL, and establish necessary and sufficient conditions for its δ-completeness. We discuss practical applications of δ-complete decision procedures for correctness-critical applications including formal verification and theorem proving. (shrink)

Given any collection F of computable functions over the reals, we show that there exists an algorithm that, given any sentence A containing only bounded quantifiers and functions in F, and any positive rational number delta, decides either “A is true”, or “a delta-strengthening of A is false”. Moreover, if F can be computed in complexity class C, then under mild assumptions, this “delta-decision problem” for bounded Sigma k-sentences resides in Sigma k. The results stand in sharp contrast to the (...) well-known undecidability of the general first-order theories with these functions, and serve as a theoretical basis for the use of numerical methods in decision procedures for formulas over the reals. (shrink)

This collection represents the best recent work on the subject and includes essays by Clark Glymour, James H. Fetzer, and Wesley C. Salmon.

A young Canadian mathematician and philosopher, Winthrop Bell, who was Edmund Husserl's first doctoral student from North America, taught as a postdoc at Harvard in the 1920s, where he took a complete set of notes in the first class at Harvard taught by Alfred North Whitehead during the 1924-1925 academic year. These notes, missing for over 80 years, have recently been found. The notes transform scholarship concerning the early development of Whitehead's mature metaphysical views, while the note-taker's own career (...) illuminates a remarkable collaboration between the pragmatists in the U. S. and Canada and the early phenomenology movement in Europe, an intellectual exchange that was shattered during the tumultuous events of World War I and its aftermath. (shrink)

_Ways of Being in the World_ is an anthology of the Indigenous philosophical thought of communities across Turtle Island, offering readings on a variety of topics spanning many times and geographic locations. It was created especially to meet the needs of instructors who want to add Indigenous philosophy to their courses but are unsure where to begin—as well as for students, Indigenous or otherwise, who wish to broaden their horizons with materials not found in the typical philosophy course. This collection (...) is an invitation to embark on a relationship with Indigenous peoples through the introduction of their unique philosophies. (shrink)

This paper primarily disputes Dreyfus’s account of Heidegger’s critique of Husserl’s theory of intentionality. Specifically, it raises objections to the three central claims of such an account; namely: that Searle’s theory of intentional action can be used as a stand-in for Husserl’s; that Heidegger rejects the primordiality of the intentionality of consciousness; and that Heidegger distinguishes between conscious and unconscious types of intentional actions and he privileges the latter over the former. I show the first to be unwarranted owing to (...) a lack of fundamental parallelisms between Searle’s and Husserl’s theories of intentionality. I show the second to be mistaken for failing to take into account Heidegger’s strategic handling of the concept of consciousness and for contradicting Heidegger’s concept of care as the essential meaning of Dasein’s being-in-the-world. Lastly, I show the third to be highly problematic for lacking in textual evidence and explanatory power. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 29, Issue 4, Page 1026-1038, December 2021.

Against its prominent compatiblist and libertarian opponents, I defend Galen Strawson's Basic Argument for the impossibility of moral responsibility. Against John Martin Fischer, I argue that the Basic Argument does not rely on the premise that an agent can be responsible for an action only if he is responsible for every factor contributing to that action. Against Alfred Mele and Randolph Clarke, I argue that it is absurd to believe that an agent can be responsible for an action when (...) no factor contributing to that action is up to that agent. Against Derk Pereboom and Clarke, I argue that the versions of agent-causal libertarianism they claim can immunize the agent to the Basic Argument actually fail to do so. Against Robert Kane, I argue that the Basic Argument does not rely on the premise that simply the presence of indeterministic factors in the process of bringing an action about is itself what rules out the agent's chance for being responsible for that action. (shrink)

... LIMITS OF MEANING Arthur O. Lovejoy Professor Emeritus, Department of Philosophy, The Johns Hopkins University Nearly thirty years ago Professor Singer ...